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Abstract: 
 
Non-R&D innovation is a prevalent economic phenomenon, though R&D has been 
the central focus of policy making and scholarly research in the field of innovation. 
The third European Community Innovation Survey (CIS-3) shows that more than half 
of the European innovative firms did not conduct intramural or extramural R&D. 
Instead of investing in R&D, they acquired advanced machinery, purchased patents 
and licenses or carried out training and marketing activities to develop product or 
process innovations. In this paper we develop a two-stage non-cooperative game to 
model the decisions of firms with regard to the size of their innovation expenditures 
or budget and the allocation of this budget between R&D and non-R&D innovation 
activities. We demonstrate how the initial productivity of firms, the share of their 
expenditures in non-R&D innovation activities, and the potential cost reduction 
achieved by the application of existing technologies or the development of new 
technologies would affect the decisions of firms. Following a theoretical framework 
and arguments, we examine the CIS-3 data to provide empirical evidence. 
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1. Introduction 
Until very recently Research & Development (R&D) has been synonymous with 
technology and innovation in many publications on science, technology and 
innovation. A rough estimate by the authors, based on Trend Chart data, reveals that 
a minimum of 95 percent of all funding for innovation in the European Union is to 
support R&D. The Lisbon strategy, which aimed to build Europe by 2010 the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, incorporated as a 
goal that R&D expenditures in the European economies should reach, on average, 3 
percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2010. As emphasized in the Lisbon 
strategy, R&D intensity is extensively used by scholars and policy makers as a 
benchmark for measuring the innovativeness of a firm, a region and a country. 
The importance of R&D is the very reason explaining the predominant role of R&D in 
innovation studies and policy making. R&D is the source of many productivity 
enhancing innovations. It is essential to competitiveness of fast-growing/high 
technology industries such as pharmaceuticals, automobiles, ICT and machinery. 
R&D is also critical to the absorptive capacity of a firm and an industry (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989) and is associated with countries’ advantages in their terms of trade. 
In addition, R&D activities create demand and supply for high caliber human 
resources which in turn give impetus to the development of the educational system 
in a country. 
Although R&D is vital for the innovation activities of firms and the competitiveness of 
an industry and a country, the third European Community Innovation Survey (CIS-3) 
shows that about half of the European firms which report to have product or process 
innovations do not conduct intramural or extramural R&D (Figure 1). In the 
technologically less developed Eastern European countries, the shares of non-R&D 
innovators are higher than in the technologically more developed Western European 
countries. Breaking down the data of non-R&D innovators by sector, we find that 
non-R&D innovators are concentrated in low technology manufacturing and in 
services sectors (Figure 2). The distribution of these non-R&D innovators is skewed 
towards small and medium sized firms (Figure 3). Given that a significant number of 
firms innovate without conducting R&D, non-R&D innovation activities should have 
drawn considerable attention from academics and policy makers. The Oslo Manual 
provides a broad definition of innovation in recognition to the fact that diffusion is 
crucial to realizing the economic benefits of innovation and that R&D only covers part 
of all of the different methods that firms use to innovate. However, there is a lack of 
systematic studies on the means, other than R&D, that firms use to innovate as well 
as thorough research that links different types of innovation to the economic 
performance of firms. 
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Figure 1: R&D and Non-R&D Innovators: Breakdown by Country (CIS-3, Micro-
aggregated data) 
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Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Notes: 1. Non-R&D innovators are defined as innovative firms which have product or process innovations, but do 
not perform intramural and extramural R&D. R&D innovators are defined as innovative firms that perform 
intramural and/or extramural R&D. 
2. NO, BE, GR, DE, HU, LT, PT, EE, SK, CZ, LV, ES, RO, IS and BG represent Norway, Belgium, Greece, 
Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, Estonia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Spain, Romania, Iceland and 
Bulgaria, respectively. 
 
Figure 2: R&D and Non-R&D Innovators: Breakdown by Sector (CIS-3, Micro-
aggregated data) 
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Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Notes: 1. The definition of Non-R&D innovators and R&D innovators is the same as in Figure 1. 
2. The definition of the sectors is fully in line with the standard of Eurostat which is available at 
http://europa.eu.int/estatref/info/sdds/en/htec/htec_base.htm. 
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Figure 3: R&D and Non-R&D Innovators: Breakdown by Firm Size (CIS-3, Micro-
aggregated data) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Note: 1. The definition of Non-R&D innovators and R&D innovators is the same as in Figure 1. 
2. Small firms are those firms employing 10-49 employees. Medium firms are those ones employing 50-249 
employees. Large firms employ 250 or more employees. 
 
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by developing a two-stage non-cooperative game 
to model the decisions of firms with regard to the size of their innovation 
expenditures or innovation budget and the allocation of their budgets between R&D 
and non-R&D innovation activities. We demonstrate how the initial productivity of a 
firm, the share of its budget in non-R&D innovation, the potential cost reduction 
achieved by buying existing technologies or investing in R&D and the strategic 
interaction between the firm and its competitors affect these decisions. By examining 
the data of the third European Community Innovation Survey (CIS-3), we provide 
empirical evidence to support the theoretical arguments. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant 
theoretical contributions to the understanding of R&D activities of firms. Section 3 
establishes a theoretical framework to analyze factors influencing the decisions of a 
firm regarding the size and the allocation of its innovation expenditures. Section 4 
presents empirical evidence drawn from the CIS-3 data to support the theoretical 
propositions and discusses policy implications. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Review of Theoretical Literature 
The models studying R&D activities of firms can be classified into two categories, i.e. 
tournament and non-tournament models (Beath et al., 1995). In tournament models, 
firms engage in competition for technological breakthroughs or patent applications. 
The single winner of the competition will take all benefits. In tournament models of a 
patent race, a firm’s probability of making a discovery and obtaining a patent at a 
certain point in time, i.e. winning the tournament, depends on the firm’s current R&D 
expenses and accumulated experience in R&D activities.1 In non-tournament 
models, firms apply for patents to protect the outcomes of their R&D investments, 
but they can not prevent other firms from achieving the same outcomes by investing 
in R&D. No matter whether models incorporate tournament or non-tournament 
elements, they reflect the two basic motives for firms’ R&D investments, which are 
increasing profits in the future by allocating resources to R&D and obtaining a 
strategic advantage over rivals (Beath et al., 1995). 
In an article related to the determinants of the number of firms that engage in R&D 
and the expected welfare performance of the industry, Quirmbach (1993) argued that 
a firm must consider the cost of doing research, the probability of succeeding, and 
the likely degree of competition in the market when making R&D investments 
decisions. There is a trade-off between risk and pay off in investing in a risky R&D 
project. A risky R&D project, although less likely to succeed, leads to larger returns if 
it successful. The decision of a firm to take such risk may be justified by its motive of 
pre-empting rivals. The idea of trade-off was modelled by Dasgupta and Stiglitz 
(1980a). However, in their model, only one firm, i.e. a monopolist, makes the 
decision of investing in R&D. In a different paper (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980b), the 
authors allowed a number of firms to enter competition, but these firms shared the 
same R&D function, which means that they were symmetric. 
Differently from the previous work, Rosen (1991) modelled the R&D activities of two 
asymmetric competing firms. The asymmetry is reflected by the difference between 
the costs of production of the two firms. The large firm has lower cost of production 
than the small one. Both firms have a menu of R&D projects with different risk levels 
to choose from. In addition to different R&D projects, they also select the levels of 
R&D investment. The firms’ choices depend on their market position and their levels 
of technology. In a two stage model setup, both firms choose their R&D investment 
levels and R&D projects with different levels of risk in the first stage. In the second 
stage, both firms engage in Cournot competition. Rosen showed that the large firm 
invests more in R&D, but in safer projects leading to incremental technological 
innovation. On the contrary, the small firm invests less, but in riskier projects which 
lead to more radical innovation. Payago-Thotoky (1996) demonstrated that the 
outcome of Rosen’s model was sensitive to the adoption of an additive or 
multiplicative cost reduction function.2 
Our simplified model, which will be presented in the next section, is similar to the 
previous work in the sense that we also incorporate the trade-off of risk and risk-free 
innovation activities in the model. We differentiate from previous work by arguing that 
the asymmetry of firms arises not only because of their size or level of productivity, 
                                            
1
 A review of patent race models is given by Tirole (1988, Chapter 10). 
2
 The model setup similar to Rosen’s can also be read in Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) and Barros and 
Nilssen (1999). 
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but that the asymmetry is also due to industry characteristics and technological 
opportunities associated with firms. 
 
3. A Simple Model of Non-R&D Innovation Activity 
 
3.1 Model Set-up 
We consider two risk-neutral firms that operate in a homogeneous product market. 
The decision making process of the two firms is modelled as a two-stage non-
cooperative game (with no collusion).  In the first stage, firms simultaneously engage 
in two types of cost reduction innovation activities which are purchasing existing 
technology and conducting R&D (either intramural or extramural R&D).3 The existing 
technology is manifested in the form of computer hardware, patents, non-patented 
inventions, licenses, know-how, trademarks, software, etc. In addition, in order to 
acquire the available technology to develop product or process innovations, firms 
organize training for their personnel, implement marketing strategies, and launch 
technical preparations, all of which involve innovation expenses. In the second 
stage, both firms participate in a Cournot competition with reduced production cost. 
Firms choose the level of their innovation budget in the first stage and allocate 
expenditures to R&D and non-R&D innovation activities. Both firms can obtain 
complete information of existing technologies which they plan to purchase these. 
Firms can definitely reduce production cost to a certain degree after purchasing 
available technologies. In this sense, purchasing existing technologies is a risk-free 
activity. In contrast, firms may fail in their R&D projects which means that their 
innovation investments in R&D may go in vain. In conducting R&D, firms thus face a 
trade-off between the risk of failure and the opportunity of making a technological 
breakthrough which will bring more dramatic cost reductions than they would obtain 
by acquiring existing advanced technologies. 
In addition to the risk of the innovation projects, firms’ decisions are also affected by 
the technological opportunity in their industry. For firms in a technologically catching-
up industry, buying existing technology from industry leaders in other regions or 
countries may be an optimal choice given the lower risk of doing so. As these firms 
build up their technological capability and approach the technology frontier, they will 
be impelled to conduct R&D to move further up the technology ladder, simply 
because they would not be able to buy more advanced technology than what they 
already possess. Differently, for firms located in an advanced industry cluster or in a 
technologically more developed region, there is little room to innovate only by 
purchasing existing technology, simply because they are already at or close to the 
technology frontier. Firms’ resources and experiences also influence their decisions 
to invest in R&D. Firms with more financial resources and more experience in R&D 
would have a higher probability to succeed in their R&D projects. Consequently, they 
are more likely to invest in such projects. 
The marginal costs of production of the two firms are i (i = 1, 2) before they invest in 
innovation. In the first stage, the two firms simultaneously determine the size of their 
innovation expenditures ei (i = 1, 2). The share of these expenditures on purchasing 
                                            
3
 Product innovation aiming to improve quality of products can also be considered as cost reduction 
innovation (Spence, 1984).  
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existing technology is xi (i = 1, 2), 0xi 1. Accordingly, the ratio of R&D expenditure 
to total innovation expenditures is 1- xi. The share of innovation expenditures for 
buying existing technology is assumed to be exogenously given. In this way, the 
share xi is a parameter in our model. Our goal is to derive the relationship between 
innovation expenditures ei and the share of these expenditures spent on existing 
technology xi. We will show later how the equilibrium value of ei changes as the 
parameter xi is altered. The cost reduction effect of existing technology is denoted by 
, meaning that if the firms spend xi ei on purchasing existing technology, they 
reduce the production cost by  i ei. Here both firms have the same , which 
indicates that firms compete in the same pan-European market and are obliged to 
meet the same quality standards, so they look for existing technologies at the same 
technological level. The probability of succeeding in R&D projects is i (i = 1, 2). The 
 	


  i( i ). If firms invest (1-xi) ei in 
R&D projec 	 
	  	
  	
   i( i) (1-xi) ei. 
Different i reflect the diverse technological opportunities in the industry and the 
dissimilar resources and experiences that the two firms possess.  and i fall in the 
set [0, 1]. We assume 
 
(1)   i( i ). 
 
A R&D project with a lower probability of success may bring a breakthrough 
technology which would reduce the production cost more than a less risky project 
would do. Therefore, 
 
(2) ( ) 0<′ ii βγ . 
If )()())(( iiiii
i
iii βγββγβ
βγβ
′+=
∂
∂
>0, then 
i
ii
ii
β
βγ
βγ
1
)(
)(
−
′
<1, which means that when the 
probability of success of a R&D project reduces by 1 percent, the effect of cost 
reduction increases less than 1 percent. Similarly, if )()( iiiii βγββγ ′+  <0, then 
i
ii
ii
β
βγ
βγ
1
)(
)(
−
′
>1, which means that when the probability of success of a R&D project 
reduces by 1 percent, the effect of cost reduction increases more than 1 percent. 
Thus the return to the risk of a R&D project is relatively lower under the condition of 
)()( iiiii βγββγ ′+ >0 than it is under the condition of )()( iiiii βγββγ ′+ <0. 
Both firms’ marginal production cost ci at the end of the first stage is i - i ei - i( i ) 
(1- xi) ei if the R&D project is successful. Otherwise, the marginal production cost is 
i -  i ei.  In the second stage of the game, the two firms engage in a Cournot 
competition in which each firm determines its production quantity qi (i = 1, 2)  
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conditional to ei. The inverse demand function is modelled as p = A- Q, where Q = q1 
+ q2. p denoting the market clearing price. We assume that 
 
(3) i <A. 
The model is solved using backward induction. In the second stage, the expected 
profit of firm i is 
 
(4) iiiii eqcqQA −−−= )(π , i = 1, 2.4 
 
Substituting ci into the expected profit function yields 
 
(5)
])ˆ())[(1(}])1)((ˆ[){( iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii eqexcqQAeqexexcqQA −−−−−+−−−−−−= αββγαβπ
 
     iiiiiiiiiii eqexexcqQA −−−−−−= ])1)((ˆ[)( βγβα , i = 1, 2.  
 
Since  	 i( i) represent the cost reduction effect of existing technology and 
successful R&D projects respectively, the relationship between 	 i( i ) reveals 
the firm’s characteristics and the technological opportunity of the industry where the 
firm operates. It follows from equation (5), that when a firm is characterized by the 
condition that )( iii βγβα − >0, purchasing existing technology would be more 
effective than conducting R&D in terms of cost reduction. In contrast, for a firm 
characterized by the condition )( iii βγβα − <0, conducting R&D would be more 
effective in terms of reducing production cost. 
The Nash-Cournot equilibrium based on equation (5) is computed as  
 
(6) ( ) ijjjjjjjjiiiiiiiii eexexcexexcA −−−−+−−−−= 9
])1)((ˆ[])1)((ˆ[2 2
*
βγβαβγβα
π ,  
i, j = 1, 2, j . 
 
Since the firms choose the level of ei in the first stage, the first order conditions for 
the profit maximization problem of firm i are 
 
(7) 0
4
92)ˆˆ2(
*
=−−++−=
∂
∂
i
jjiiji
i
i
s
esesccA
e
π
, where )1)(( iiiiii xxs −+= βγβα  and 
)1)(( jjjjjj xxs −+= βγβα , i, j = 1, 2, j . 
                                            
4
 The fixed cost of production is normalized to zero. 
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We obtain a sub-game perfect equilibrium value of ei* as 
 
(8) 
i
i
jii
i
s
Ac
sss
e
−
++=
ˆ
4
3
2
3
2
*
, i, j = 1, 2, j . 
 
In order to have ei*>0, we need 
 
(9) i > 
ji ss
A
4
3
2
3
−− . 
 
3.2 Comparative Statics 
 
We unfold our analysis of comparative statics by computing the first order derivative 
of ei* with respect to i, xi, xj, , i and j as follows: 
 
(10) )1)((
1
ˆ
*
iiiiii
i
xxc
e
−+
=
∂
∂
βγβα , 
 
(11) ))()(ˆ
4
33( 223
*
iii
i
jii
i
ii
s
Ac
sssx
e βγβα −−++−=
∂
∂
, 
 
(12) ))((
4
3
2
*
jjj
jij
i
ssx
e βγβα −−=
∂
∂
, 
 
(13) ])ˆ(
4
)(33[ 2223
*
i
ii
ji
ijji
i
ii
s
xAc
ss
sxsx
s
xe −
+
+
+−=
∂
∂
α
,  
 
(14) ))()()(ˆ
4
33)(1( 223
*
iiiii
i
i
jii
i
i
i
s
Ac
sss
x
e βγββγβ
′+
−
++−−=
∂
∂
, and 
 
(15) ))()()(1(
4
3
2
*
jjjjjj
jij
i x
ss
e βγββγβ
′+−−=
∂
∂
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Based on assumption (3) and equation (9), 
 
(16) 223
ˆ
4
33
ii
s
Ac
sss
i
ji
−
++ >0 and 
 
(17) 2223
)ˆ(
4
)(33
i
ii
ji
ijji
i
i
s
xAc
ss
sxsx
s
x −
+
+
+  >0. 
 
Therefore the sign of equation (10) is positive and the sign of equation (13) is 
negative. The sign of equation (11) depends on the sign of )( iii βγβα − and the sign 
of equation (12) depends on the sign of )( jjj βγβα − . The sign of the equations (14) 
and (15) are determined by the sign of )()( iiiii βγββγ ′+  and of )()( jjjjj βγββγ ′+ , 
respectively. We establish the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: A firm with a relatively higher initial production cost or a lower initial 
productivity will have higher innovation expenditures. 
 
Proposition 2: A firm will decrease its innovation budget as it invests more in 
purchasing existing technology if buying existing technology is more effective in 
terms of cost reductions than conducting R&D ( )( iii βγβα − >0).  
A firm will increase its innovation budget as it invests more in purchasing existing 
technology if buying existing technology is less effective in terms of cost reductions 
than conducting R&D ( )( iii βγβα − <0). 
The explanation for this proposition is straightforward: if acquiring existing 
technology is more effective for a firm, then the firm will need to invest less in 
innovation in the future to acquire the same cost reductions to compete in the 
market. In this sense, choosing the appropriate type of innovation could save 
resources for firms. 
 
Proposition 3: A firm decreases its innovation expenditures when its competitor 
increases the share of its innovation budget in purchasing existing technology if for 
this competitor buying existing technology is more effective in terms of cost 
reductions than conducting R&D ( )( jjj βγβα − >0).  
A firm increases its innovation expenditures when its competitor increases the share 
of its innovation budget in purchasing existing technology if for this competitor buying 
existing technology is less effective in terms of cost reductions than conducting R&D 
( )( jjj βγβα − <0). 
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Proposition 4: A firm decreases its innovation expenditures when the cost reduction 
effect of purchasing existing technology intensifies. 
 
Proposition 5: If the return to the risk of conducting a R&D project is relatively low 
( )()( iiiii βγββγ ′+ >0), a firm decreases its innovation expenditures as the probability 
of succeeding in the R&D project increases. If the return to the risk of conducting a 
R&D project is relatively high ( )()( iiiii βγββγ ′+ <0), a firm increases its innovation 
expenditures as the probability of succeeding in the R&D project increases. 
This proposition is intuitive in the sense that a firm would increase its investment in a 
risky R&D project as long as the R&D project renders a high return. On the other 
hand, it is not worthwhile for a firm increasing its investment in a risky R&D project if 
the return to risk is low. 
 
Proposition 6: A firm decreases its innovation expenditures as its competitor attains 
higher probability of succeeding in in-house R&D if the return to the risk of an in-
house R&D project is relatively lower for that competitor ( )()( jjjjj βγββγ ′+ >0).  
A firm increases its innovation expenditures as it competitor attains higher probability 
of succeeding in in-house R&D if the return to the risk of an in-house R&D project is 
relatively higher for that competitor ( )()( jjjjj βγββγ ′+ <0). 
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4. Empirical Evidence from the Third European Community Innovation Survey 
 
4.1 Data, Dependent and Independent Variables    
We explore empirical evidence for the three first propositions using data of the third 
European Community Innovation Survey (CIS-3). The Community Innovation Survey 
data are collected on a four-yearly basis. The CIS-1 survey was carried out in 1993, 
the CIS-2 survey in 1997/1998 and the CIS-3 survey in 2000/2001. As with previous 
Community Innovation Surveys, CIS-3 is based on the Oslo Manual (second edition 
from 1997) which provides methodological guidelines and defines the innovation 
concept. The cleaned dataset includes 14430 manufacturing firms located in 18 
European countries, namely Belgium, Germany, Finland, Norway, Island, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.5 Propositions 4 to 6 are not empirically 
tested as we cannot construct proper variables using the data covered by CIS-3. 
To test the propositions (1) to (3) derived in section 3, we adopt the following general 
econometric framework:  
 
(18) (Innovation expenditure intensity) = f {(Key explanatory variable), (control 
variables)}, 
 
We use the innovation expenditure intensity in 2000, i.e., the ratio of total innovation 
expenditure to turnover, as the dependent variable. To test proposition 1 which looks 
into the relationship between innovation expenditures and initial productivity level, 
the logarithm of labour productivity in 1998 is chosen as the key explanatory 
variable. For proposition 2, which tests the relationship between innovation 
expenditures of a firm and its decision to allocate expenditures to R&D and non-R&D 
innovation activities, we construct the non-R&D innovation expenditure share as a 
key explanatory variable, which is defined as the ratio of innovation expenditure 
excluding intramural and extramural R&D expenditure to total innovation 
expenditure. 
An important condition which leads to different theoretical predictions in propositions 
2 and 3 is whether buying existing technologies is more effective in terms of cost 
reductions than conducting R&D. As suggested in Section 3, firms in a 
technologically catching-up industry or country would consider buying existing 
technologies from technological leaders as an optimal choice because existing 
technologies bears less risk. Arguably, a technological leader is most likely to have 
the highest productivity in an industry or operates in a country where the average 
productivity of firms is higher than those of the firms in other countries. A firm 
                                            
5
 The original dataset includes manufacturing and service firms which together amount to 71602 firms. 
We clean the data through deleting 186 observations with negative values of labour productivity, 
innovation expenditure intensity, or non-R&D innovation expenditure share. We also delete 180 
observations with innovation expenditure intensity greater than 1. We then exclude all service firms 
which in the cleaned dataset amount to 25999. We also exclude the manufacturing firms which have 
zero innovation expenditure and that did not report their innovation expenditure (missing value in the 
dataset), which amount to 17064 and 13756, respectively. Finally we focus on the remaining 14430 
manufacturing firms which all have innovation expenditure intensities greater than 0, but less than or 
equal to 1. 
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operating in a technologically advanced country is thus more likely to become a 
technological leader than its counterparts operating in a technologically lagging 
country. For such a firm, buying existing technologies would be less effective in 
terms of cost reductions than conducting R&D, simply because it is already at the 
technological frontier and it thus has to rely on R&D to innovate and further reduce 
costs. 
To identify technologically advanced and lagging countries in Europe, we classify the 
18 countries according to the average labour productivity for the NACE two-digit 
sectors of each country. The average labour productivity of each two-digit 
manufacturing sector in each country is ranked in Table 1. The arithmetic average of 
the ranks of all sectors for each country is calculated and then countries are ranked 
according to this arithmetic average. By ranking the arithmetic average (last row in 
Table 1) we obtain the relative position of each country. This exercise shows the 
following ranking of European countries in terms of technological level (in 
descending order): Italy (the highest level), Belgium, Finland, Norway, Spain, 
Germany, Iceland, Greece, Slovenia, Portugal, Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia, 
Hungry, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria (the lowest level). Although this 
ranking based on labour productivity is by no means perfect, it does demonstrate 
that the Western European countries (EU-15 countries) have a higher technological 
level than their counterparts in the East or the new EU member states, which is 
consistent with the general perception. 
Different from proposition 2, proposition 3 illustrates how the investment in non-R&D 
innovation activities by competitors in the market would affect the level of innovation 
expenditures of a firm. To test proposition 3, we construct various variables to 
measure the average ratio of non-R&D innovation expenditure shares of competing 
firms in the market. Competing firms are grouped according to productivity ranks of 
the countries. We first divide the 18 European countries into three groups, each with 
6 countries. Italy, Belgium, Finland, Norway, Spain and Germany are in the country 
group with highest labour productivity levels. The competing firms operating in these 
countries are referred to as Type A firms. Iceland, Greece, Slovenia, Portugal, Czech 
Republic and Latvia are in the group with medium labour productivity levels. Firms in 
these six countries are referred to as Type B firms. Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria are grouped together as they have lowest labour 
productivity levels. Competitors operating in these countries are called Type C firms. 
We construct a variable for the average non-R&D innovation expenditure share of 
competing firms in the same country group by dividing the sum of non-R&D 
expenditure of all firms in the same four-digit NACE sector and the same country 
group except the one under analysis by the sum of total innovation expenditure of all 
firms in the same four-digit NACE sector and the same country group except the one 
under analysis. We also compute two variables to measure the average non-R&D 
innovation expenditure share of competing firms in the different country groups by 
dividing the sum of non-R&D expenditure of all firms in the same four-digit NACE 
sector but in the different country group by the sum of total innovation expenditure of 
all firms in the same four-digit NACE sector but in the different country groups. The 
methodology of constructing these three variables is shown in Table 2. 
To perform a robustness test, we re-divide the 18 countries into two groups, each of 
them including 9 countries. Italy, Belgium, Finland, Norway, Spain, Germany, 
Iceland, Greece and Slovenia are regarded as advanced countries with higher labour 
productivity levels. Portugal, Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, 
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Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria are classified as catching-up countries with lower 
labour productivity levels. Similarly to the analysis based on the three-country-group 
classification, we compute the average non-R&D innovation expenditure share of 
competing firms in the same country group and different country group. 
 
 
Table 1: Ranking of Average Labour Productivity of the European Firms in Each 
Two-Digit Manufacturing Sector and Each Country 
 
Industry 
Sector 
(NACE 
Code) 
BE BG CZ DE EE ES FI GR HU IS IT LT LV NO PT RO SI SK 
15 1 18 12 6 13 5 4 8 11 9 2 17 15 3 7 16 10 14 
16 10 6 2 4 No Data 
No 
Data 
No 
Data 
No 
Data 
No 
Data 5 
No 
Data 11 1 9 3 8 7 
No 
Data 
17 1 18 11 3 13 5 4 9 12 8 2 16 15 6 10 17 7 14 
18 1 17 11 5 15 3 7 6 10 9 2 14 13 4 8 18 12 16 
19 1 17 10 6 12 5 4 7 14 15 No Data 13 3 8 16 9 11 2 
20 1 18 14 8 12 7 3 2 15 5 6 16 11 4 9 17 10 13 
21 2 17 11 6 14 4 1 12 9 15 No Data 10 3 8 16 7 13 5 
22 2 18 12 1 14 5 7 6 10 8 3 17 15 4 11 16 9 13 
23 10 4 2 12 1 5 11 No Data 
No 
Data 3 
No 
Data 
No 
Data 8 9 7 6 
No 
Data 
No 
Data 
24 1 18 12 7 14 6 4 5 11 8 3 16 15 2 9 17 10 13 
25 1 18 12 6 15 5 4 10 9 7 2 13 16 3 8 17 11 14 
26 1 18 11 7 14 6 4 8 12 2 5 16 13 3 9 17 10 15 
27 2 18 13 6 10 5 1 8 15 7 4 16 12 3 9 17 11 14 
28 5 17 12 7 11 6 1 8 13 2 4 15 16 3 10 18 9 14 
29 1 17 12 5 13 6 2 10 11 7 3 16 15 4 8 18 9 14 
30 9 14 10 5 2 4 7 3 12 No Data 
No 
Data 1 11 15 8 13 6 
No 
Data 
31 3 16 12 7 13 6 1 9 15 5 4 17 11 2 8 18 10 14 
32 1 17 12 2 14 6 4 8 10 11 No Data 16 3 7 15 9 13 5 
33 6 18 13 4 12 7 2 10 11 3 5 15 16 1 8 17 9 14 
34 1 17 11 4 13 2 5 14 7 10 No Data 15 6 8 16 9 12 3 
35 5 18 13 3 14 4 6 9 10 8 2 12 16 1 11 17 7 15 
36 3 17 11 6 15 8 5 7 13 2 1 16 14 4 10 18 9 12 
37 6 12 14 3 9 5 1 16 No Data 10 
No 
Data 15 13 2 8 11 7 4 
Arithmetic 
Average 3 16 11 5 12 5 4 8 12 7 3 14 11 5 10 14 10 11 
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Table 2: Methodology of Constructing the Variables of Average Non-R&D Innovation 
Expenditure Share of Competing Firms in Different Country Groups (Dividing 18 
Countries into Three Groups) 
 
The Value of the Variables 
The Variables 
Regressions on firms in 
Italy, Belgium, Finland, 
Norway, Spain and 
Germany (countries with 
high labour productivity 
level) 
Regressions on firms in 
Iceland, Greece, 
Slovenia, Portugal, 
Czech Republic and 
Latvia (countries with 
medium labour 
productivity level) 
Regressions on firms in 
Slovakia, Hungary, 
Estonia, Lithuania, 
Romania and Bulgaria 
(countries with low 
labour productivity 
level) 
Average non-R&D 
innovation 
expenditure share 
of competing firms 
in the same country 
group (dividing 18 
countries into three 
groups) 
A B C 
Average non-R&D 
innovation 
expenditure share 
of competing firms 
in a different country 
group with the 
higher labour 
productivity level 
B A A 
Average non-R&D 
innovation 
expenditure share 
of competing firms 
in a different country 
group with the lower 
labour productivity 
level 
C C B 
Note: 1. A: Average non-R&D innovation expenditure share of competing firms in Italy, Belgium, Finland, Norway, 
Spain and Germany (countries with high labour productivity level); B: Average non-R&D innovation expenditure 
share of competing firms in Iceland, Greece, Slovenia, Portugal, Czech Republic and Latvia (countries with 
medium labour productivity level); C: Average non-R&D innovation expenditure share of competing firms in 
Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria (countries with low labour productivity level). 
 
 
4.2 Control Variables 
The control variables in the econometric framework include: firm size (measured by 
the logarithm of number of employees), “innovation independence” variables 
(independence of product and independence of process innovation), “R&D 
continuity” variable and country dummy variables. 
Schumpeter (1950) was among the first to hypothesize that large firms in a mature 
capitalist economy generate a disproportionately large share of society’s 
technological advances. Scholars who support this hypothesis have articulated that 
larger firms possess larger-scale, internally-generated funds, so they secure more 
resources to conduct risky R&D projects. Scale economies of R&D activities and 
return to R&D investment due to larger volume of sales also contribute to larger 
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firms’ advantages. However, Cohen et al. (1987) argued that these points were 
flawed because of inadequate attention to the unit of analysis and to industry effects. 
They found that firm size, overall, has a very small, statistically insignificant effect on 
business unit R&D intensity. In a recent study, Lee and Sung (2005) contended that 
firm size does not directly affect R&D intensity, but it does indirectly by affecting firm-
specific technological competences.6 Although no consensus has been reached on 
the relationship between firm size and R&D or innovation intensity in previous 
literature, we include the logarithm of the number of employees of a firm as a control 
variable in our analysis. 
Firms which independently develop their product and process innovations may invest 
more in innovation than those conducting their innovation projects in collaboration 
with other organizations. We construct variables of independence of product 
innovation and independence of process innovation to control for the impact of 
independence of innovation on innovation expenditure intensity. The values of the 
variables of independence of product or process innovation are 1 if a firm reports 
that mainly it and its group develop product or process innovations. The values are 0 
if a firm reports that it develops product or process innovations in cooperation with 
other enterprises or institutions or that mainly other enterprises or institutions 
develop the product or process innovation. Firms which conduct R&D projects 
continuously and which have a long-term commitment to innovation may spend more 
on innovation than firms which only occasionally engage in R&D projects. We 
construct a variable named “continuity of R&D” to control for the effect of continuous 
R&D on innovation expenditure intensity. The value is 1 if a firm reports that it has 
engaged in R&D continuously. Otherwise, the value is 0. We are aware that the 
causal relationship may run from the innovation expenditure intensity to the 
independence of product and process innovation and to continuity of R&D activity as 
firms with more resources can afford to develop product and process innovations on 
their own or continuously finance R&D projects. However, the central focus of this 
paper is not on the control variables. Consequently we do not instrument the control 
variables in our analysis. 
The firms from each of the 18 countries would on average account for about 5.6 
percent of total firms in the sample. However, in our cleaned dataset, German, 
Italian, Romanian and Spanish firms account for 7.6 percent, 23.8 percent, 8.8 
percent and 17.1 percent, respectively, which indicates that firms from these four 
countries are over-represented. To control for this over-representation, we include 
four country dummy variables in the regressions. The names of all variables and the 
methodology of constructing them are listed in Table 3. 
 
                                            
6
 The empirical studies on the relationship between firm size and innovation are reviewed by Cohen 
(1995). 
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Table 3: The Variables 
 
Variable Name Definition and Note 
Innovation expenditure intensity 
(dependent variable) Total innovation expenditure in 2000/ Turnover in 2000 
Logarithm of labour productivity (1998) 
(Unit of labour productivity: 1000 Euro 
per employee) 
Ln(Turnover in 1998 / Employee number in 1998) 
Non-R&D innovation expenditure share 
of the firm under analysis 
Innovation expenditure excluding intramural and extramural 
R&D expenditure / Total innovation expenditure 
Average non-R&D innovation 
expenditure share of competing firms in 
the different country group with the 
higher labour productivity level (dividing 
18 countries into three groups) 
See Table 2 
Average non-R&D innovation 
expenditure share of competing firms in 
the different country group with the 
lower labour productivity level (dividing 
18 countries into three groups) 
See Table 2 
Average non-R&D innovation 
expenditure share of competing firms in 
the same country group (dividing 18 
countries into two groups) 
Sum of non-R&D expenditure of all firms in the same four-
digit NACE sector and in the same country group except the 
one under analysis / Sum of total innovation expenditure of 
all firms in the same four-digit NACE sector and in the same 
country group except the one under analysis 
Average non-R&D innovation 
expenditure share of competing firms in 
the different country group (dividing 18 
countries into two groups) 
Sum of non-R&D expenditure of all firms in the same four-
digit NACE sector but in the different country group / Sum of 
total innovation expenditure of all firms in the same four-digit 
NACE sector but in the different country group 
Firm size  Ln(Employee number in 2000) 
Independence of product innovation  
The value is 1 if a firm reports that mainly it and its group 
have developed a product innovation. The value is 0 if a firm 
reports that it has developed a product innovation in 
cooperation with other enterprises or institutions, or that 
mainly other enterprises or institutions have developed the 
product innovation for the firm 
Independence of process innovation 
The value is 1 if a firm reports that mainly it and its group 
have a developed process innovation. The value is 0 if a firm 
reports that it has developed a process innovation in 
cooperation with other enterprises or institutions, or mainly 
other enterprises or institutions have developed the process 
innovation for the firm 
Continuity of R&D  The value is 1 if a firm reports that it has engaged in R&D 
continuously. Otherwise, the value is 0 
Dummy variable for German firms The value is 1 if a firm is a German firm. Otherwise, the 
value is 0 
Dummy variable for Italian firms The value is 1 if a firm is an Italian firm. Otherwise, the value is 0 
Dummy variable for Romanian firms The value is 1 if a firm is a Romanian firm. Otherwise, the 
value is 0 
Dummy variable for Spanish firms The value is 1 if a firm is a Spanish firm. Otherwise, the 
value is 0 
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4.3 Econometric Strategy 
 
We only focus on firms which have positive innovation expenditure intensities. We 
are not interested in firms that did not invest in innovation in the survey period. For 
those, the key explanatory and the dependent variable are zero when testing for 
propositions 2 and 3. Given the fact that the values of the dependent variable fall in 
the range of [0,1], we estimate the regressions using Ordinary Least Square.7 We 
control for heteroscedasticity in all regressions.8 
 
4.4 Results 
 
To test proposition 1, we regress the dependent variable “innovation expenditure 
intensity” on the key explanatory variable “logarithm of labour productivity in 1998”, 
controlling for firm size, innovation independence, R&D continuity and the four 
country dummies. As seen in Table 4, the regression is run for each two-digit sector. 
For the 23 two-digit sectors, all coefficients of the logarithm of labour productivity in 
1998 are negative and 15 of them are statistically significant. The insignificance of 
some coefficients may be due to the limited number of observations in certain 
industry sectors, e.g. tobacco products (NACE 16) and petroleum products (NACE 
23). In all two-digit sectors, firms with lower productivity in 1998 will have larger 
innovation expenditure intensities in 2000, although results were only statistically 
significant in 15 sectors.9 These results confirm proposition 1. 
                                            
7
 We could also see the firms with positive innovation expenditures as a selected sample of all firms. 
Accordingly, we will use a sample selection model such as Heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimator in 
the regression of future analyses. 
8
 The variance-covariance matrix is estimated by a sandwich estimator of variance (Huber, 1967). The 
formula for the robust estimator of variance is VuuVv j
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. For the linear regression such as the Ordinary Least 
Square, 11 )’)(’()’( −− Ω= XXXXXXv , which is a White heteroscedasticity consistent estimator 
(White, 1980). 
9
 An interesting result is that we find negative and significant results for 12 out of 15 low- and medium-
low tech sectors but only for 3 out of 8 high- and medium-high-tech sectors (cf. footnote 10 for a 
definition of this classification). 
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Table 4: Relationship between Innovation Expenditure Intensity (Dependent variable) 
and Initial Production Cost (Logarithm of Labour Productivity in 1998, Key 
Explanatory Variable) – Testing proposition 1 - Results 
 
NACE 
Classification Industry 
Number of 
Observations 
Key Explanatory Variable (Logarithm 
of Labour Productivity in 1998) 
15 Food products and beverages 1583 -.013 (.0032)*** 
16 Tobacco products 26 -.043 (.025) 
17 Textiles 661 -.014 (.0037)*** 
18 Wearing apparel 485 -.018 (.0034)*** 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather 252 -.014 (.0078)* 
20 Wood and wood products 562 -.012 (.0048)*** 
21 Pulp and paper 342 -.011 (.010) 
22 Publishing and printing 611 -.012 (.0043)*** 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products 70 -.021 (.029) 
24 Chemicals 1100 -.013 (.0036)*** 
25 Rubber and plastic products 781 -.018 (.0043)*** 
26 Non-metallic mineral products 793 -.0075 (.0037)** 
27 Basic metals 463 -.012 (.0063)* 
28 Fabricated metal products 1176 -.017 (.0033)*** 
29 Machinery and equipment 1549 -.012 (.0029)*** 
30 Electrical and optical 
equipment 122 -.011 (.016) 
31 Electrical machinery and 
apparatus 710 -.013 (.0052)** 
32 Radio, television and 
communication equipment 439 -.0017 (.0057) 
33 Medical, precision and 
optical instruments 545 -.0050 (.0064) 
34 Motor vehicles 479 -.0075 (.0072) 
35 Other transport equipment 324 -.0097 (.0073) 
36 Furniture 832 -.014 (.0032)*** 
37 Recycling 78 -.067 (.024)*** 
Note: 1. The data in parentheses refer to standard deviations. *** denotes a significance level of 1%, 
** denotes a significance level of 5%, * denotes a significance level of 10%. 
2. To simplify, the coefficients of the control and dummy variables are not reported. 
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Manufacturing firms in different sectors do not rely on R&D to acquire technology or 
to innovate in the same way. In his paper on innovation in British manufacturing 
industries, Pavitt (1984) concluded that in scale-intensive sectors such as metal 
manufacturing and vehicles, firms generally tend to develop their own process 
technology. In textile firms, however, most process innovations come from suppliers. 
Therefore, R&D intensity does not accurately measure innovation efforts in certain 
manufacturing sectors, particularly in low-technology sectors (von Tunzelmann and 
Acha, 2005). In addition to R&D activities, other important contributors to innovation 
efforts include design, engineering development, testing and prototyping, adoption-
related learning activities, and exploration of markets for new products (Smith, 2005). 
Considering the different extent to which firms rely on non-R&D activities to innovate 
in different industries, we analyze firms in high- and medium-high-tech sectors and 
low- and medium-low-tech sectors separately when testing propositions 2 and 3.10   
Proposition 2 predicts that the innovation expenditure intensity of a firm decreases 
as its non-R&D innovation expenditure share increases if the firm finds purchasing 
existing technology more effective in terms of cost reductions than conducting R&D. 
Firms that compete by buying existing technology normally lag behind the 
technological frontier. Arguably, they are likely to operate in catching-up countries, 
instead of advanced ones. Proposition 2 also predicts that the innovation 
expenditure intensity of a firm increases as its non-R&D innovation expenditure 
share increases if the firm finds purchasing existing new technology less effective in 
terms of cost reductions than conducting R&D. Firms that compete by innovating by 
performing R&D are at the technological frontier. Arguably, they are likely to operate 
in advanced countries. Our empirical analysis in Table 5 shows that the coefficients 
of the variable of non-R&D innovation expenditure shares of the firms under analysis 
are positive and statistically significant in the regressions for firms in the high-labour-
productivity and medium-labour-productivity country groups for all sectors, which 
confirms proposition 2. The theoretical prediction related to firms in the low-labour-
productivity country group is not as clear as for the other two country groups (high 
and medium labour productivity). As a result, it is not surprising to find negative 
coefficients in the regressions for firms in the low-labour-productivity countries. The 
coefficient of the variable is negative (-.029) and statistically significant in the 
regression for the high- and medium-high-tech sectors in the low-labour-productivity 
country group, which also supports proposition 2. However, the coefficient of the 
variable in the regression on the low- and medium-low-tech sectors in the low-
labour-productivity country group is positive (.030) and statistically significant, which 
is not consistent with proposition 2. The different signs obtained in the regressions in 
the high- and medium-high-tech and in the low- and medium-low-tech sectors in 
countries with low labour productivity levels justify that we estimate for firms in 
different sectors separately. 
Different from proposition 2 which predicts how the decision of a firm in allocating its 
innovation budget would affect the budget itself, proposition 3 is concerned with how 
                                            
10
 The high- and medium-high-tech sectors are the industry sectors of NACE 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 
34 and 35. The low- and medium-low-tech sectors are the industry sectors of NACE 15, 16, 17, 18, 
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 36 and 37. The classification of high-, medium-high-, medium-low- 
and low-tech sectors in this paper is fully in line with the standard of Eurostat and the OECD (cf. the 
Concepts and Definition Database (CODED), Eurostat, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nomenclatures/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_NOM&StrGroupCode=
CONCEPTS&StrLanguageCode=EN) 
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the innovation budget of a firm would be affected by competitors’ decisions and 
activities. As shown in Table 5, we use three variables to measure the impact by 
competing firms. To understand the results of the three variables “average non-R&D 
innovation expenditure share of competing firms in the same or different country 
groups, we recall the methodology of constructing the variables described in Table 2. 
The results of the variable of “average non-R&D innovation expenditure share of 
competing firms in the same country group”  shows that the decisions of competitors 
operating in the high-labour-productivity countries (Type A competitors) positively 
impacts the innovation expenditure intensity of the low- and medium-low-tech 
sectors in the same country group (the coefficient is .025), thus supporting 
proposition 3. A negative coefficient (-.021) which is statistically significant at 10 
percent is obtained for the competing firms in the medium-labour-productivity 
countries (Type B competitors) in the regression for the high- and medium-high-tech 
sectors in the same country group. The negative sign of this variable is not perceived 
as contradictory evidence to proposition 3, since the theoretical prediction is less 
clear in terms of whether the sign would be positive or negative for firms in medium-
labour-productivity countries. 
The results of the variable “average non-R&D innovation expenditure share of 
competing firms in the different country groups” demonstrate a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for Type A competitors which operate in medium-
labour-productivity countries in the low and medium-tech sectors (the coefficient is 
.021). Negative and statistically significant coefficients are attained for Type B 
competitors (the coefficients are -.028 and -.040)  which operate in countries with 
high labour productivity level in high and medium-high-tech sectors and in countries 
with low labour productivity level in high and medium-high-tech sectors respectively 
and Type C (the coefficients are -.023 and -.021) competitors which operate in high-
labour-productivity countries in high and medium-high-tech sectors and in medium-
labour-productivity countries in low and medium-low-tech sectors respectively. These 
results are supportive of proposition 3. 
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To test for robustness in propositions 2 and 3, we re-divide the 18 countries into two 
groups. As for proposition 2, the coefficients (.018 and .040) of the variable of non-
R&D innovation expenditure share of the firm under analysis is positive and 
statistically significant in the regressions on the firms in the advanced countries, for 
both high and medium-high tech sectors and for low and medium-low-tech sectors,  
which again confirms proposition 2 (Table 6). However, the coefficient (.037) is also 
positive in the regression on the firms in the catching-up countries in the low and 
medium-low tech sectors, which contradicts the theoretical prediction.  
As for proposition 3, four coefficients are statistically significant and three are 
supportive of proposition 3. One coefficient of the four significant ones (-.023) shows 
that the non-R&D innovation expenditure share of competing firms in advanced 
countries negatively impacts the innovation expenditure intensity of high- and 
medium-high-tech sectors’ firms in the same country group, which contradicts 
proposition 3 (Table 6). These results are supportive of proposition 3. 
The coefficients of the variable of firm size are universally negative both in Tables 5 
and 6, which indicates that larger firms have lower innovation intensities. The degree 
to which firms independently develop product innovations is negatively associated 
with their innovation intensity. However, firms which develop process innovations 
independently and which have continuous R&D activities have higher innovation 
intensities. 
 
4.5 Discussion for SYSTEMATIC sectors 
 
The universal negative signs of all the coefficients in Table 4 show that for all the 
SYSTEMATIC sectors firms having lower labour productivity in 1998 would have 
higher innovation expenditure intensities in 2000. However, the coefficients are only 
significant for the sectors of food (NACE 15), textiles (NACE 17 and 18), chemicals 
(NACE 24) and machinery (NACE 29). The insignificant coefficients of some 
SYSTEMATIC sectors can be attributed to few observations in the regressions of 
those sectors such as tobacco (NACE 16) (26 observations), energy (NACE 23) (70 
observations) and electrical and optical equipment, one of the ICT sub sectors 
(NACE 30) (122 observations). For radio, television and communication equipment, 
another ICT sub sector (NACE 32), the coefficient is not significant despite a large 
number of observations. 
It is very difficult to disentangle the SYSTEMATIC sectors from the results testing 
propositions 2 and 3. The high- and medium-high-tech sectors in Tables 5 and 6 
include the industry sectors of NACE 24 and 29 to 35. SYSTEMATIC sectors, 
including chemicals (NACE 24), machinery (NACE 29), ICT (NACE 30 and 32), 
automotive (NACE 34) and aerospace (NACE 35.3), account for a majority part of 
the high-and medium-high-tech sectors. Therefore, we argue that the results related 
to the high- and medium-high-tech sectors are applicable to SYSTEMATIC sectors 
of NACE 24, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.3. However, the weight of the SYSTEMATIC 
sectors, including food (NACE 15 and 16), textiles (NACE 17 and 18) and energy 
(NACE 23) is much less significant in the low- and medium-low-tech sectors 
examined in Tables 5 and 6, which include NACE 15 to 23, 25 to 28, 36 and 37. 
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5. Summary and Policy Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we develop a two-stage non-cooperative game to model the decision 
of firms with regard to the size of their innovation expenditures and the allocation of 
these expenditures between R&D and non-R&D innovation activities. We 
demonstrate how the initial production cost or productivity of a firm, the cost 
reduction effect of existing technology and performing R&D, and the share of non-
R&D innovation expenditures of a firm and its competitors would affect the size of 
the innovation expenditures of a firm. 
Following the theoretical framework and arguments, we examine the data of the third 
European Community Innovation Survey (CIS-3) to provide empirical evidence. We 
find that in all two-digit NACE sectors, European manufacturing firms with lower 
labour productivity in 1998 have larger innovation expenditure intensities in 2000, 
which conforms to the theoretical proposition that a firm with lower initial productivity 
will have a larger innovation budget. This results would suggest a catching-up 
process in innovation spending as firms which start at lower levels of productivity 
spend relatively more on innovation than firms which start at higher level of 
productivity. Similarly, there will be a catching-up process within the same industry 
between different countries if there are differences in labour productivity levels 
between these countries. However, we do need to recall that our econometric 
analysis is focusing on development over a period of three years whereas catching-
up processes normally take more time. The predicted catching-up process in our 
model might thus not yet be visible in the observed productivity developments within 
Europe. 
By regressing the innovation expenditure intensity of European manufacturing firms 
on their non-R&D innovation expenditure shares, we demonstrate evidence that 
supports the proposition that a firm which is away from the technological frontier 
should increase its innovation expenditures on acquiring existing technologies so it 
can maintain its competitive edge with a smaller innovation budget. Similarly, a firm 
which is at the technological frontier and which spends less on R&D would have to 
increase its innovation expenditures to be able to compete in its market. In general, 
these propositions lead to the argument that choosing appropriate ways of 
innovation can save resources for firms. While for firms away from the technological 
frontier would be more economical to acquire existing technologies, for firms already 
at the frontier, it would be better to continue to push it forward. 
To test the theoretical proposition about how the innovation expenditures of a firm 
would be affected by the decision of its competitors with regard to the allocation of 
their innovation expenditures, we explore the relationship between the innovation 
expenditure intensity of a firm and the non-R&D innovation shares of its competitors. 
The results obtained in the empirical analysis are by and large consistent with the 
theoretical predictions of our model. In other words, a firm will decrease its 
innovation expenditures when its competitor increases the share of its innovation 
budget in purchasing existing technology if for this competitor buying existing 
technology is more effective in terms of cost reductions than conducting R&D. 
One conclusion is that policies aimed at increasing innovation co-operation between 
firms, universities and research institutes will close the gap to the technological 
frontier and thereby raise the share of R&D-based innovation. An improvement of 
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existing R&D support mechanisms will further stimulate firms to invest in R&D. 
However, as shown by Arundel et al. (2008), non-R&D innovators develop in-house 
innovative capabilities as non-R&D innovative activities, also requiring creative 
efforts leading to productivity improvements, improved competitiveness and to new 
and improved products and processes. It therefore seems more justified to pursue 
policies aimed at improving the use of existing technologies by technology adoption, 
incremental changes, imitation and combining existing knowledge in new ways for 
firms not as technologically advanced as so-called innovation or technology leaders. 
This will in particular apply for firms in more low-tech industries and in lagging 
countries. But R&D policies are needed for those firms close to or even at the 
technological frontier, so as to ensure that this frontier will be continuously pushed 
ahead, increasing the stock of available technologies and innovations, which not only 
benefit these high-technology firms, but also the firms who rely for their innovation on 
adopting and implementing existing technologies through non-R&D innovation. 
For firms it is important to carefully review different innovation strategies, whether to 
follow an R&D innovation strategy by investing in R&D or to follow a non-R&D by 
adopting and acquiring existing technologies. For firms far from the technological 
frontier the latter strategy is more efficient and more cost effective. Choosing the 
right strategy will not only save scarce resources, but will also make their innovation 
investments more effective. Firms should also actively be involved in formal and 
informal networks to increase their access to available knowledge which will facilitate 
their decision to invest in the appropriate innovation strategy. 
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